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Haupert: Economic Developments in Tajikistan

Economic Developments in Tajikistan by Tyler Haupert
Abstract:
Poor nations often leave countless young males without an education, a stable
family, or a strong government to follow. These conditions make the choice to join a
group of religious radicals appealing. Tajikistan, a country of over seven million located
just north of Afghanistan in Central Asia, is surrounded by war torn, politically unstable
neighbors and fits the profile of a hotbed for religious radicalism. While the country has
avoided a large-scale international war, political instability and economic deficiencies
have left Tajikistan primed for future conflict. The situation presents an intriguing study
for those concerned with humanitarian issues and those involved in security matters alike.
This in-depth inspection of the state’s complex economy reveals areas of great concern
along with reasons for optimism.

Economic Developments in Tajikistan

Tajikistan is a nation in which a civil war and blatant government corruption have
gone largely unnoticed by Western eyes. However, the country is located in the center of
a region of great martial and economic importance to the United States and Western
Europe. Its neighbor to the west, Uzbekistan, recently forced a U.S. military base off its
territory. Iraq, a small distance southwest of Tajikistan is currently rebuilding its
government while attempting to avoid civil war. Additionally, Afghanistan, directly to
the south, remains occupied by U.S. troops. Tajikistan itself has the potential to become a
focus of international attention for reasons other than its troubled neighbors. Poor Islamic
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nations frequently leave countless young males without an education, a stable family, or a
strong government to follow. These conditions make the choice to join a band of
religious radicals appealing; such groups provide social networks, access to food and
shelter, and a sense of purpose. In this context an understanding of Tajikistan’s economy
becomes significant to any organization or individual concerned with violence and
terrorism across the globe. The country’s combination of governmental corruption, a
largely uneducated youth, and severe poverty creates a volatile atmosphere that merits
attention from both humanitarian and international security entities.
Since the Central Asian states gained their independence in 1991, much ink has
been spilled regarding their economic development as both independent nations and as a
collective region. While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess significant oil resources,
Uzbekistan boasts a sizeable industrial infrastructure, and Kyrgyzstan has implemented
aggressive economic reform since the breakup of the Soviet Union, little progress has
taken place in Tajikistan. In a region that would have been content to preserve the
adjusted Soviet Union suggested by Gorbachev rather than be forced into independence,
Tajikistan has experienced the most difficulty sustaining stable nationhood.1 However,
despite being plagued by corruption, insufficient infrastructure, unfriendly neighbors and
a crippling drug trade, the nation’s economy is not beyond repair. This essay will provide
a brief background of Tajikistan’s current government and an assessment of the bloody
civil war that, among other things, played a large part in placing the nation in its current
state of poverty. Subsequently, a discussion of more specific issues affecting
contemporary Tajikistani economy will be undertaken culminating in remarks on the
country’s fiscal outlook as well as some suggestions for future action.
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Civil War, Rahmonov, and Poverty

Like the regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the Tajikistani government has
been criticized for its lack of transparency. However, in contrast to its neighbors to the
west, Tajikistan did not initially fall from Moscow’s hands into those of a powerful
leader. Within a year of declaring its independence Tajikistan plunged into a devastating
civil war that not only killed between 60,000 to 100,000 people, but was responsible for
the destruction of much of the nation’s economic infrastructure.2 The war lasted from
1992 to 1997, and output dropped drastically during that time period. Due to a
combination of deterioration, war-related destruction, and outright theft, “,manufacturing
output in 1997 was only 27% and agricultural output 50% of the 1990 level”.3 During the
span of 1991-1996, Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined at an average
rate of 17% annually, before reporting modest growth between 1996 and 1999.4
Additionally, many government officials previously responsible for the oversight of the
nation’s economy were killed or expelled during the war, leaving command to the
inexperienced. Thus, Tajikistan was left with a damaged infrastructure which disabled its
once thriving agricultural industry, and a largely inexperienced administration.
As the war finally came to an end in 1997, a new president obtained complete
control over Tajikistan. Emomali Rahmonov, a supposed democrat, brought corruption
and further instability to the Tajikistanis, but, if nothing else, gave the nation a center of
authority to follow. Rahmonov took little discretion when appointing individuals to
numerous government positions. Rather than seeking qualified persons, the president
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appointed those who had supported him during the war while marginalizing those who
had not. A prime example of Rahmonov’s irresponsible appointments can be found in
Ghaffor Mirzoyev, who was given the position of head of the Tajik Drug Control Agency
in 2004. Less than a year later Mirzoyev was arrested for charges including illegal
possession of weapons, tax evasion, and murder.5 The Tajikistani government not only
has trouble controlling its citizens, as drug trafficking and tax evasion are major
problems, but the recklessness of its administrative appointments results in lawlessness in
positions where political stability is sorely needed.
While the economic performance of Tajikistan has been poor, the rate of poverty
among citizens is equally, if not more alarming. Although accurate statistics are difficult
to gather, nearly 65% of the population is believed to live in poverty.6 While this is a
marked improvement since 1999, when poverty was estimated at over 80%, the spread of
reduction has been uneven, with the population in the Ferghana Valley experiencing a
much slower decline.7 To put these numbers into perspective, per capita income in
Tajikistan is currently less than $1 per day, and is anticipated to grow to only $375 per
year by 2015.8 Thus, Tajikistanis are not expected to climb out of the ranks of the poorest
nations in the world anytime soon.

Issues
The overwhelming rate of poverty in Tajikistan is the result of more multifaceted
troubles than an irresponsible president and a civil war. The war did, however, put the
nation almost a decade behind in trying to cope with the added responsibilities of
independence. Today the economy in Tajikistan is characterized by problems in the
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domestic market, a weak infrastructure, and complex foreign relations. Some of these
issues, however, present hope and the possibility for improvement in the lives of
Tajikistan’s populace.

Trade: Internal and External

The demand for internal commerce in Tajikistan is increasing. Unfortunately, the
government has been largely unable to tax this trade. This is in part due to the great
increase in informal services, which are very challenging to record, much less tax.9
Difficulty collecting taxes is further perpetuated by the incidence of tax evasion. Imports
are to be taxed between 5% and 7.7%, according to the Eurasian Economic Community.
However, under-invoicing—an evasive method in which importers report only a portion
of the goods they receive—likely costs the Tajikistani government between $250 million
and $300 million each year in revenue.10 Dushanbe simply lacks the resources to strictly
enforce its tax policy and it pays dearly for this insufficiency. The sum of revenue lost
from tax evasion is significant as it amounts to over 20% of Tajikistan’s yearly GDP of
roughly $1.3 billion. The nation must find a way to better handle its own trade before it
can sufficiently cope with its growing need for international commerce.
Tajikistan’s external sector is vulnerable due to its reliance on a small number of
products. Combined, cotton and aluminum account for over 80% of the nation’s
exports.11 The third largest export, hydroelectricity, is plagued by poor infrastructure and
sluggish construction of new plants. The export sector is growing, but an increased
internal need for previously exported products will cause the nation to accumulate an
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average account deficit increase of over $70 million during the next decade. On a more
positive note, foreign direct investment is expected to accrue slowly, but steadily, due to
an improving external policy environment. This will help Tajikistan begin to climb its
way out of debt.12 Though currently working with a trade deficit, the import-to-export
ratio will continue to improve in the near future. Taxes and trade, however, will remain
problematic issues if Tajikistan is unable to improve administrative capabilities and gain
control over a number of its industries.

Farming

The agricultural industry in Tajikistan is the nations largest, and it accounts for
the majority of lower class citizens’ employment. The industry, however, has been
plagued with problems since the beginning of the civil war. Farm privatization is among
the most talked about issues hindering the Tajikistani economy. Although farm land was
officially privatized in 2001, private land has been illegally given to government officials
or people with connections to the local land distribution committees.13 Though
illegitimate, these practices continue due to the government’s weak law enforcement. The
government-appointed land owners are abusive, “dictating to farmers what they should
plant and what prices they can charge for their crops”.14 The owners also pay farmers
extremely low wages and sell their products at well below market prices. International aid
companies, such as the International Monetary Fund, have proposed to take farmers’ land
away and give it to companies to cover debts.15 Such suggestions are ill-advised and
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promote agricultural insufficiency; stepping further away from total privatization hinders
the industry’s ability to cater to local and regional food needs
Unfortunately, struggles remain even for those farmers who are able to take full
ownership of their land. Domestic manufacturers pay 10% more than foreign companies
for state-grown cotton. A local manufacturer pays “…$1,056 per ton, as opposed to $948
per ton of raw cotton sent abroad for processing”.16 Thus, local manufacturers are at a
disadvantage when trying to buy cotton in Tajikistan. To make the problem worse, trade
restrictions and closed borders with Uzbekistan give both local farmers and
manufacturers few options outside of trading with each other. While this situation may
seem to benefit farmers by allowing them to charge somewhat high prices for their
cotton, it has resulted in the closure of some factories due to high costs.17 This leaves
factory workers unemployed and farmers with surplus cotton.
Another dilemma afflicting private farmers is the lack of access to good credit. It
is estimated that “…up to 90% of private farms in Tajikistan have developed a
dependency on…loan sharking operations”.18 By the end of 2005, collective cotton farms
and private farmers owed upwards of $220 million mainly to Swiss investors. This
amount is equivalent to over 150% of annual cotton revenue.19 In addition to interestheavy loan programs, authorities gave private farmers a share of the debt that had been
owed by the collective farms they took over.20 Loan difficulties give the farming industry
little hope of running debt free in the foreseeable future unless international aid offers
funding. However, unlike the capital-heavy aluminum and hydroelectricity industries
farming does not attract a significant degree of attention from foreign investors.
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Aluminum

The only significant money-making enterprise that survived the civil war was the
aluminum smelter located in Tursunzade. The smelter does, however, require much repair
to reach full efficiency.21 Whereas aluminum production exceeded 500,000 tons per year
during Soviet times, the plant produced only 380,000 tons in 2005.22 While it is far below
potential output, this number should be viewed in a positive light considering 183,000
tons were produced in 1997. This plant is one of Tajikistan’s top earners of foreign
money, making it maintenance a top priority for Tajikistan’s government. Rahmonov’s
attention, however, is more likely focused on the hydroelectricity sector, as that
industry’s money making possibilities are immense.

Hydroelectricity

Tajikistan’s potential for hydroelectricity production is the greatest of the Central
Asian states and one of the greatest in the world. Between 1950 and 1985 hydroelectricity
prompted the Tajikistani GDP to grow 13.5-fold.23 Yet as of 2005, the annual output was
less than 5% of the nation’s capacity.24 During the time of the Soviet Union, plans for
many large irrigation systems and hydroelectric plants were envisioned. However, most
of these plans were left undone at the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the personnel
who developed them largely left the country. Currently, international aid, mainly from
Russia and Iran, is helping to finish the construction of hydroelectric plants that could
significantly boost Tajikistan’s ability to produce adequate electricity for its own use and
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for sale in other countries. Hydroelectricity is possibly Tajikistan’s most practical
investment since “...supplies are much higher than the republic’s own needs, while the
country has no industrial deposits of oil and gas, and it is very unprofitable to develop the
nation’s coal fields”.25 The construction of new plants is very expensive, but electric
independence appears a worthwhile investment.
Currently, Iran and Russia are the only two nations actively supporting
Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity development. For example, on April 12, 2006, Russian
conglomerate Unified Energy Systems (UES) announced that contractors would speed up
construction to meet deadlines for the completion of the Sangtuda-1 plant. The plant,
which is set to be completed in 2009, will cost UES approximately $500 million to
construct. However, the company’s investment will buy it a 75% share in the power
plant.26 Much of Russia’s investment in Tajikistan has come by way of hydroelectricity
development. Russia itself possesses about one quarter of the world’s water resources and
has recently pressed for the creation of a Eurasian hydropower association. The nation
seeks to dominate the Central Asian water tap in order to someday gain revenues from
the Chinese and Indian markets.27
Iran is also pouring millions of dollars into Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity sector,
reportedly spending a total of $700 million to complete the Sangtuda-2 power plant.28
This plant is the larger sister plant to the Russian-funded Sangtuda-1. The Middle-Eastern
nation is working on a number of massive projects, mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Perhaps most ambitious is the decision of Russian entity RUSAL to complete the
Rogun dam and power plant. RUSAL is an aluminum company with apparent
connections to the Kremlin.29 The corporation has agreed to spend upwards of $1 billion
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to complete the dam, which was left unfinished from the Soviet era. The initial plans
called for the completion of a 335 meter tall dam, which would be the world’s highest.30
The hydroelectricity plant at Rogun would be capable of producing twice as much
electricity as Tajikistan’s current largest producer.31 The dam’s completion, which is not
set for over five years, would give Russia a firm grip on the Central Asian water supply.
While many projects in hydroelectricity have begun, the government needs to
foster a transparent policy environment in which foreign contributors will be willing to
place extensive funds. Also, to make the distribution of electricity to Tajikistan and its
neighbors efficient, pipelines and electric grids must receive serious investment.
Currently, the northern part of the country, located in the Ferghana Valley, has no access
to electricity produced in southern plants. Thus, this region must get 85% of its electricity
from Uzbekistan.32 In addition to these problems, the attention on building new facilities
has led to the neglect of older hydropower plants. Over $600 million needs to be spent to
repair and maintain the country’s current facilities. Although these difficulties are
pressing and, if ignored, will interfere with the smooth development of Tajikistani
hydropower, the construction of large hydropower plants is nonetheless a positive step
for Tajikistan’s economy. Upon their completion many jobs will be created for
Tajikistanis currently working in Kazakhstan and Russia.

Migrant Workers

The situation involving migrant workers traveling from Tajikistan to, for the most
part, Russia, presents a double-edged sword for the nation’s economy. On one hand, the
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estimated one million workers employed abroad each year send home remittances that are
vital to the survival of their families.33 The remittances routinely total over $600 million
per year, which amounts to about three times the state budget.34 This number also makes
up at least 20% of the nation’s yearly GDP.35 Thus, migrant workers play a huge role in
the economic well-being of many Tajikistani citizens.
While these numbers are encouraging, the migrant worker situation imposes many
negative effects on the nation as well. To start, the phenomenon creates a drain of skilled
workers in Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s fragile farming industry is plagued by inefficiency as
most young, skilled workers choose to travel to Russia or Kazakhstan to work for better
wages. The already vulnerable farms are forced to employ second-rate workers,
furthering their troubles and giving little relief to their debt.36 In addition to creating
troubles on farms, foreign employment attracts much of the base of young potential
teachers.37 Migrant workers have also become involved in drug trafficking, thus souring
their relationship with Russia. The Kremlin recently spoke of implementing stricter
border enforcements that would prevent much of the foreign workforce from entering the
country.38 The ability to close its borders to Tajikistani workers has given Russia
“...tremendous negotiating leverage”.39 If the Kremlin does decide to tighten either the
registration regulations at its borders, or another aspect of the free crossing of its borders,
“...the political situation in Tajikistan would be severely affected”.40 Although many
troubles stem from the migration of workers, its ability to supply Tajikistan’s citizens
with money is extremely valuable. If Russian borders were closed due to drug smuggling
Tajikistanis would have few options for sufficient employment.
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Drug Trade

Drug trafficking has overwhelmed Tajikistan since Afghanistan’s poppy growing
industry moved near the two nations’ border. There is, perhaps, no other issue that so
damages Tajikistan’s relationships with other nations, it’s image to the world, and the
state of its economy. With the overwhelming bulk of illegal drugs entering from the
southern border with Afghanistan, the greatest concentration of narcotics are carried
along the road running northeast from Dushanbe into southern Kyrgyzstan. They then
pass through to Kazakhstan and on to the Russian market. Some 100 tons of heroin pass
through Tajikistan each year according to United Nations (UN) estimates.41 With such a
massive amount of heroin passing through Tajikistan’s borders, the drug trade is linked to
between 30% and 50% of the nation’s economic activity, with the latter being more
likely.42 Though some argue that much of Tajikistan’s commercial recovery since the
civil war is due to the drug trade, trafficking is hardly desirable for the economy.43 The
narcotics trade “undermines the political will for economic reform and corrupts
government institutions”.44 The trade is so detrimental to the economy not only because
of its corrupting power, but also because little of the income is spent on productive
capital investment and none of it, by nature, is taxed. Thus, up to 50% of the economic
activity in the nation is spent in unproductive ways and gains no tax revenue for the
financially unstable government.
As of the turn of the century, some local observers suggested the drug trafficking
problem was eclipsing radical Islamic activity as Tajikistan’s top security threat. The
validity of this point is confirmed by the social issues stemming from the today’s drug
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trade. The nation is experiencing drastic increases in local heroine addicts, as well as the
spread of HIV/AIDS, a disease that was rarely seen anywhere in Central Asia a decade
ago.45 Furthermore, an astounding amount of government corruption is believed to
revolve around the drug trade industry. The 2004 arrest of Tajikistan’s Drug Czar,
Ghaffor Mirzoyev, epitomizes this vice.46 Such occurrences elicit distrust from citizens of
the nation and do little to convince the international community that Tajikistan’s
government is a legitimate recipient of aid. Surprisingly, the Tajik Drug Control Agency
(TDCA) is regarded as a very professional organization that, with the help of Russian
border guards, has been making progress in the fight against trafficking. However, the
TDCA is undermanned and under-funded and in recent years has been able to seize only
about 10% of total drug activity coming through Tajikistan.47 Put simply, drug trafficking
has grown into a major concern for Tajikistan’s government and its citizens and unless
substantial foreign or non-governmental organization (NGO) aid is allocated to help stop
the flow of heroine across Tajikistan’s borders the problem will persist and worsen.
International aid would not only keep drugs from crossing into major markets, but would
also allow Tajikistan to spend money currently supporting border control and narcotics
regulation on neglected areas such as education and poverty.

Education

Along with the drain of skilled individuals to Russia, the education system is to
blame for the lack of reliable and well-trained workers in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, given
the current condition of education in the country “the skill level of the workforce seems
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certain to deteriorate even further”.48 Since the end of the Soviet era, the enrollment of
15-18 year olds in school dropped from 40% to 23%. This rate places Tajikistan evenly
with Moldova as the post-Soviet state with the lowest percentage of high-school age
children attending school.49 The current state of the education system puts the country’s
youth in danger of being less educated than their parents. Schools not only suffer from
insufficient educational supplies, but often lack the basic necessities of any facility
accommodating human life. A quarter of schools in Tajikistan lack heating, a quarter lack
a water supply and a third lack toilets.50 Over 50% of the nation’s schools require capital
investment and, while the number of high school age children has increased, the amount
of spots in classrooms has decreased.51 In a few years, if the school system continues to
lose teachers, “...50% of the country’s children will be illiterate, while the other 50% will
be insufficiently educated”.52 In order to solve this problem, international aid is required.
The government in Tajikistan is reluctant to spend money on education as much of their
resources are taken by a crippling drug trade and a very costly, yet necessary,
hydroelectricity system. Oddly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advised that, to
reduce the risk of inflation, the government should reduce the number of teachers in
secondary schools by about 100,000.53 International organizations who are capable of
providing aid, such as the IMF, must take into account that nations with unstable
economies and insufficient education are breeding grounds for Islamic radicalism. It is in
the best interests not only of the forthcoming generation of Tajikistanis, but also of the
international community, to help improve the school system in Tajikistan. If citizens are
educated early and well, they will be less likely to become delinquent, unemployed, or
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involved with drugs. These developments would make Tajikistan’s affairs with some of
its closest neighboring countries considerably less problematic.

International Relations

While the status of Tajikistan’s relationships with Uzbekistan, Iran, and Russia is
quite unique, each has, or could potentially have a great impact on the Tajikistani
economy. Also to be noted, Tajikistan has had substantial contact with both China and
the United States in recent years. However, despite their potential to do so, neither of
these nations has had a significant economic effect on Tajikistan as of yet.

Uzbekistan

If Tajikistan could choose only one nation to improve its relations with,
Uzbekistan would be first on the list. Unlike the other nations to be discussed in this
section, Uzbekistan has been nothing but troublesome to Tajikistan, both socially and
economically. Uzbekistan is also the only nation to be discussed in this section that
shares a border with Tajikistan—a border that has become a very heated subject.
Uzbekistan claims that its closed-border policy with Tajikistan is due to the
inability of Rahmonov and the Tajikistani government to effectively deal with Islamic
radicalism in the Ferghana Valley.54 However, a more subtle agenda, which includes
keeping Tajikistani goods out of the Uzbek market, is widely suspected. The unstable
behavior of Uzbekistan regarding the border has caused great disturbances in the
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Tajikistani economy due to Tajikistan’s previous reliance on Uzbekistan’s roads and
railways for trade and travel. Due to the lack of a reliable road from Dushanbe to
Khujand in the north, residents from the northern areas of the nation previously traveled
through Uzbekistan to reach the airport in the capital city. However, Uzbekistan’s closed
border now forces Tajikistanis from the Ferghana Valley to make a four to five hour
drive to Batken’s airport in Kyrgyzstan.55 In addition to complicating travel plans, the
border closure causes great strain on the Tajikistani market. During Soviet times, over
80% of goods from Tajikistan were shipped by freight through Uzbekistan. Now, a much
more arduous route into Kyrgyzstan must be taken. This also results in the sale of Tajik
goods in the very competitive market in Kyrgyzstan.56 Imports, such as natural gas, are
also affected negatively by Uzbekistan’s border policy. The problem became so severe
that in 2004, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan held talks of building a gas pipeline through
northern Afghanistan in order to avoid Uzbekistan.57 Natural gas continues to be a
contested issue for the two nations. In 2006 Uzbekistan cut off gas shipments to the
Ferghana Valley region of Tajikistan under the premise that Tajikistan was late on
payments for earlier shipments.58 Tajikistan, however claims that they owe over $4
million less than what was requested by Uzbekistan. In an act of retaliation, Tajikistan
blocked shipments of gas from western Uzbekistan to eastern Uzbekistan.59 Border issues
between the two nations continue to be hostile, with neither showing any signs of ending
the quarrels.
Uzbekistan also ardently opposes recent developments in Tajikistan’s
hydroelectric sector. Under agreements made in the Soviet era, “…Uzbekistan and other
downstream states receive water from Tajikistan at almost no charge in order to meet
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their substantial irrigation needs”.60 Uzbekistani authorities have long feared the
development of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric sector would jeopardize the water supply to
those downstream. RUSAL, the Russian company contracted to complete Tajikistan’s
Rogun dam and power plant, has recently been influenced by Uzbekistan. Immediately
after a meeting between RUSAL’s chief Oleg Deripaska and Uzbekistan’s President
Karimov, “…the Russian company revised its dam plans, saying it wanted to build a 280meter tall dam, instead of one 335 meters tall as originally planned”.61 Uzbekistan’s
influence on the international community is perhaps a greater threat to Tajikistan’s
economy than border closures and trade restrictions. Tajikistanis are fortunate that other
foreign nations, such as Iran and Russia, do not deal with them so negatively.

Iran

Tajikistan’s relations with Iran sharply contrast those with Uzbekistan. While
only a few years ago Iran kept its distance from Tajikistan—due mainly to the majority of
Tajikistan’s population claiming Sunni Islam as opposed to the Shiism practiced in
Iran—the nations have now forged a powerful friendship. Tajikistan and Iran share
historical connections which are exemplified by their common Persian dialects. This link
is distinctive between the two, as the other Central Asian nations speak Turkic languages.
Lately, much fraternal speech has been exchanged between these nations describing their
relationship to one another. In a July 2006 press conference, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad proclaimed, “We should have everything in common—economy, culture
and art; the frontiers dividing us should be eliminated”.62 Tajikistan’s administration has
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been receptive of Ahmadinejad’s warmth, however they are aware of the risk of the
Iranians pursuing a hidden agenda of cultural and ideological exportation.
All talk of culture aside; Iran has invested much in Tajikistan’s economy, most
notably in the hydroelectric sector. As mentioned above in the Hydroelectricity section,
Iran has invested a total of $700 million in the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric plant.63 Perhaps
more noteworthy is Iran’s commitment to build a tunnel linking Dushanbe and Khujand.
The project has a price tag of $180 million and would eventually turn into a road linking
China to the Persian Gulf.64 The road project is especially significant in that, upon its
completion, it will alleviate much of the turmoil plaguing trade and travel from the
Ferghana Valley to Dushanbe. Iran’s investment in Tajikistan, despite possibly allowing
Iranian ideologies to infiltrate the Tajikistani nation, is a positive development that was
unforeseen half a decade ago. However, whatever degree of influence Iran manages to
grain over Tajikistan through heavy spending and friendly language will likely be viewed
as an afterthought to Russia’s tight grasp.

Russia

Russia possesses the ability to dictate the success or failure of Tajiksian’s
economy to an unmatched degree. Though independent for over 15 years, Tajikistan still
relies on Russia in a number of ways. Moscow has a hand in Tajikistani hydropower,
deploys permanent troops in Tajikistan, and through means of migrant workers and trade,
supplies Tajikistan with a significant portion of its GDP. This is all quite understandable,
as “there is no post-Soviet state, the political and intellectual elite of which is as pro-
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Russian as it is in Tajikistan”.65 Nearly all of Tajikistan’s political and public figures
were educated in Russia or other Union republics, and there is no one in top positions of
government who has a good grasp of English. Thus, Tajikistan’s outlook on the West is
largely constructed by Russia’s media.66 Despite the attempts of nations such as Iran to
build strong ties with Tajikistan, it is, for the moment, Russia’s nation.
Russian investment in hydropower is welcomed and even planned for in
Tajikistan. President Rahmonov stated in early 2006 that “strategic cooperation with
Russia remains Tajikistan’s foreign policy priority”.67 Russian work on the Rogun dam,
the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant, and the Tursunzade Aluminum plant is underway and
set to be completed within the decade. Significant profits are expected from these
ventures, as the companies investing are each set to receive a large share of the earnings.
Also, Russia’s keen interest in Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity is bolstered by the planned
construction of large aluminum plants in its own southern regions. While Russia is
currently seeking hydroelectric power in Tajikistan for its own use and for sale to
Afghanistan, Moscow is known to desire eventual access to Chinese and Indian
markets.68 Though the hydropower plants in Tajikistan are of much gain to Russia, they
nonetheless will help Tajikistan gain electrical independence and economic stability in
the long run.
Russian influence in Tajikistan is unlikely to be replaced or even compromised
anytime in the near future. With the 201st division deployed in Tajikistan, Russia’s
physical presence is symbolic of its control over the nation. Also, Tajikistani migrant
workers in Russia give Moscow a great deal of leverage when dealing with Dushanbe.
Tajikistan simply cannot continue to run without economic support from Russia.
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Suggestions for Action

Tajikistan’s economy, though improving, remains very weak and is insufficient to
keep the majority of its citizens out of poverty. The nation is still expected to be the
poorest in the Central Asian region in 2015, with over a third of its population living
below the poverty line.69 In addition to the ongoing improvements in the hydropower and
drug-control sectors there are a few specific measures that, if taken both by Tajikistan
and the international community, could bring significant progress in the next decade.

Keeping ties with Russia Strong. Remittances offer the best opportunity for reducing
individual debt and pulling families out of poverty. As Russia has complete control over
the destiny of Tajikistan’s migrant workers, it is important that Tajikistan continues to
work closely with Moscow. This includes strengthening ongoing efforts to improve
control over drug trafficking. However, as improvements are made to roads and other
means of transportation in Tajikistan, the narcotics industry will become even more
difficult to suppress.

Working to Introduce a More Transparent Government. In order to be viewed with
respect by the international community, Rahmonov must clean up the actions of his
administration. Relations with Uzbekistan are tense, and will only worsen if more
corruption in the Tajikistani government is exposed. Also, NGOs and Foreign nations
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will be, as they have been in recent years, reluctant to give money to a government with
inaccurate reports of earnings, tax collections, and other financial information.

Using Aid to its Fullest Potential. While forgiving debt and giving money directly to the
government resemble acceptable actions, the international community must be more
responsible in its awarding of aid to Tajikistan. Rather than forgiving debt, foreign
nations and international banks might defer loans, while investing in the human capital in
Tajikistan. If education and health services are given adequate funding, the nation will
eventually be able to pull itself out of debt, rather than be pulled out.

Conclusion

A union of religious radicalism, governmental instability, and social unrest has
resulted in war, suffering, and international distrust in many of Tajikistan’s neighboring
countries. While an economic revival would not provide the poverty stricken state
complete immunity to the woes plaguing its region, increased prosperity would
undoubtedly improve the lives of countless Tajikistanis from a humanitarian standpoint.
Indeed, Western ignorance—or, at the very least, indifference—to the social, economic,
and political situations existing in countless poor nations has contributed to unchecked
terrorism and unaided suffering. The Tajikistani economy may appear insignificant when
the scope of the global marketplace is considered, however the implications of its
successes and failures are vast.
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